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Abstract 
The intersection of the post-conflict reconstruction processes established in Nepal’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006, and the post-disaster reconstruction effort 
that swung into action following the country’s devastating earthquakes in 2015 provides an 
important opportunity to observe to what extent synergies between the two reconstruction 
processes have been successfully exploited. This paper critically examines these two 
processes, demonstrating that despite a growing recognition of the value of linking these 
processes by researchers, in practice they often remain separate. It shows how certain actors 
have framed the post-disaster reconstruction as unrelated to post-conflict activities in order to 
avoid what they perceive as the risk of politicising – and thus delaying – the post-disaster 
reconstruction process. The paper suggests that this is a mistake. The process of post-disaster 
reconstruction is innately political and intricately entwined with the very same issues and 
activities the post-conflict reconstruction process attempted to address. Moreover, we argue 
that the entire process is taking place within a political context which is a product of the as-
yet unresolved post-conflict polity. Any reconstruction process that does not take this into 
account risks being undermined by the same challenges that underpinned the country’s 
conflict. 
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The politics of the post-conflict and post-disaster nexus in Nepal 
Introduction 
The process of reconstruction following a crisis, whether it was caused by armed conflict 
or natural hazard-related disaster (NHrD) is long and complex. It commonly takes many 
years to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, if it reaches such a point at all. In a striking 
number of cases, of which Nepal is a prime example, this process is further complicated 
when communities are affected by both natural hazard-related disasters and armed conflict. 
Nepal was still struggling to implement the raft of measures and reforms aimed at rebuilding 
the country following its ten year civil war when it was hit by two massive earthquakes, 
triggering a second reconstruction process.1 This intertwining of the post-conflict 
reconstruction process (PCR) established in Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
and the post-disaster reconstruction (PDR) effort that swung into action following the 2015 
earthquake provides an important opportunity to observe how these two processes affect each 
other, and to what extent key stakeholders have been able to exploit the synergies between 
the two reconstruction processes in their efforts to rebuild. In this respect, Nepal’s 
experiences can provide a vital insight to a wider contemporary debate in the fields of 
disaster risk reduction and post-conflict reconstruction; how should we understand the 
relationship between the phenomena of violent conflict and NHrDs, particularly the 
interventions that follow them, and how might this affect the way we approach disasters, be 
they caused by war or natural hazards? Although to some the two phenomena are entirely 
separate (see, for example, Albala-Bertrand’s work)2 this paper will use the case of Nepal to 
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demonstrate the importance of viewing the two processes within the same framework, as well 
as providing some insights as to why the idea that conflict and disaster are unrelated persists 
so stubbornly. 
This is particularly important given the complete erasure of the question of war and 
violent conflict from the flagship global document on disaster risk reduction, the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (hereafter Sendai Framework). This document 
represented a great leap forward in the way the international community addressed disasters 
when it was signed in 2015. It placed the ‘build back better’ principle popularised following 
the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 at the heart of post-disaster reconstruction;3 firmly 
favoured a proactive approach to disaster risk management over responding to them post 
facto; and advocated for a cross-sectoral approach that recognises the linkages between 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), climate change and development, in theory at least.4 However, 
a critical opportunity was missed when negotiators decided to remove all references to war 
and violent conflict from the document’s final draft, deeming these to be too political.5 This 
striking silence is in spite of overwhelming evidence that some of the world’s most 
vulnerable communities are often affected by a layering of conflict and natural hazard related 
disasters. Indeed, 50 per cent of the world’s NHrD affected populations between 2005 and 
2009 (up to 80 per cent in some years) were situated in fragile and conflict affected states.6 
This is a striking example of the devastating negative cycle in which a community’s 
vulnerability to either conflict or disaster is worsened by the effects of the other. As the 
Nepalese experience described in this article will show, to deny the links between conflict 
and disaster – particularly on the grounds that the former will ‘politicise’ latter – is both 
unrealistic and presents a missed opportunity to break this cycle of mutually reinforcing 
vulnerabilities and find ways to live up to the idea of building back better after crisis. This is 
particularly important considering that the experience of Nepal could be compared with a 
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number of other contexts where the timeline of post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction 
differs.   
This article represents part of a wider study of the PCR-PDR nexus at the policy level, 
comparing a number of such cases, including Sri Lanka, where a post-disaster reconstruction 
process has been followed by the reconstruction after an armed conflict, and Aceh where 
such two process have taken place concurrently after the 2004 Tsunami disaster that also 
helped to bring about the end of a civil war. It understands PCR and PDR as the overarching 
terms to describe a range of activities carried out to repair the physical, political, social and 
economic fabric of a community after it has been disrupted by conflict or natural hazard 
related disaster, activities which are distinct from the immediate provision of relief in the 
aftermath of a crisis. 
Methods 
The paper is based on 20 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 29 people carried out 
over three weeks in February 2017, as part of a wider comparative research programme 
entailing fieldwork in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. Interviewees included representatives of the 
Nepalese government, local and international NGOs, and international and donor 
organisations. Given that the focus of this paper is on decisions made with regards to policy, 
stakeholders were recruited with expert knowledge of post-disaster and post-conflict policy 
making at the national and international levels. At the national level these included 
government bodies, local NGOs, and researchers and academics. At the international level 
representatives of INGOs, international organisations and donor governments were also 
interviewed. Semi-structured interviews usually lasted between 45–85 minutes, and 
employed a grounded theory based approach (one that focused on generating theory from 
data as it was collected, rather than testing the applicability of a previously identified theory)7 
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that enabled the authors to adapt questions as key themes became apparent and triangulate 
important elements of information as they emerged. These interviews were carried out in 
Kathmandu, since this is where the policy making community is based. In addition to these 
elite interviews, the authors also conducted a number of informal focus group discussions 
with practitioners from a number of international and national NGOs as well as 
representatives of youth groups. The study also draws on extensive background research into 
the impact and progress of post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction so far (including 
data from the United Nations Common Feedback Project, and reports by international 
organisations and INGOs), as well as one author’s previous research in earthquake affected 
communities Sindhupalchowk in April 2016, to provide context.   
Context 
Nepal is a country of diversity in terms of its geography, caste structure and ethno-
linguistic groups, where the most recent census (2011) recorded a population of 26.5 million 
people formed by 125 ethnic and caste groups. Geographically, it is one of the most 
mountainous countries in the world, home to the towering peaks of the Himalayas, and yet 
the fertile Terai plains region along the country’s southern border plays a key role in its 
economic and agricultural production. Although the country remains predominantly rural, it 
is urbanizing at one of the fastest rates in the region, creating both problems and 
opportunities in a country which still finds itself on firmly on the list of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).  It is within this context that both armed conflict and disaster have 
occurred within a relatively short period of time. The earthquake struck less than 9 years after 
the end of the war and at a time the Nepali government was still struggling to implement the 
measures identified in the peace accord (still engaged in the ‘reform’ and ‘peace 
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consolidation’ phases of the post-conflict reconstruction process),8 compounding the 
country’s physical and socio-economic challenges.  
From its inception on 13 February 1996 to the signing of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement on 21 November 2006, the Nepalese civil war caused around 13,000 deaths, 
thousands more disappearances, and resulted in the internal displacement of up to 150,000 
people, claiming a particularly heavy toll on impoverished rural communities. It pitted the 
Nepalese government against a Maoist insurgency which sought to abolish the country’s 
powerful monarchy and install a ‘People’s Republic’ in its place. As the war drew on the 
Maoists increasingly exploited widespread dissatisfaction at Nepal’s glaring inequality – a 
product of factors including the country’s rigid caste system, urban-rural divide and 
discrimination against indigenous groups and women – to garner support for their cause.9 The 
conflict came to an end after several years of high drama in Nepali public life. The murder of 
King Birendra and nine other members of the royal family by Crown Prince Dipendra 
(including himself) in June 2001, was followed by a rapid intensification of violence from 
both parties and the restoration of absolute monarchy by King Gyanendra in February 2005. 
This move prompted extensive protests against the authoritarian rule of King Gyanendra and 
gave the Maoists and mainstream political parties common cause to work together towards 
the restoration of representative democracy. Soon after, the international community, led by 
the United Nations, started to channel money into the country in support of the CPA and 
related peace-building efforts. In addition to measures related to the separation of the warring 
parties (and the eventual demobilization or integration into the Nepalese armed forces of the 
Maoist fighters), the peace agreement focused strongly on questions related to the inclusion 
of previously marginalised groups, and the transformation of the country’s political 
structures. In order to achieve these aims a number of new structures and activities were 
introduced in the years following the war’s end, including a Constituent Assembly, 
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transitional justice mechanisms such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme for ex-combatants, and 
physical reconstruction projects for infrastructure damaged during the decade long conflict.  
It is clear that in this time some progress has been made, for example in areas such as 
DDR and the inclusion of the Maoists in the political process, and there seems little chance 
now that the Maoists would take up arms again. However, it would be a mistake to present 
the conflict as having been resolved.  In fact, some of the most important factors in this 
conflict have not been effectively addressed in the decade following the war’s end. This was 
highlighted by the violent and widespread protests that greeted the government’s hurried 
promulgation of a new constitution in 2015, and would eventually claim 45 lives.10 To many, 
particularly from the country’s large Madhesi and Tharu communities, the new constitution 
represented a regression on key issues such as citizenship, federalism, inclusion and 
representation.  Politics in Nepal remain highly unstable, characterised by frequent changes 
in government, the threat of violence and the persistence of the same pernicious inequalities 
that first led the Maoists to take up arms.11 Therefore, despite the time that had passed it is 
appropriate to understand Nepal in 2015 as still in the midst of negotiating post-war 
transition, challenged by conflict drivers. 
It was against this backdrop that further tragedy struck in the spring of 2015, when the 
country was shaken by two devastating earthquakes. The first, on 25 April, had a magnitude 
of 7.8 and resulted in the deaths of nearly 9,000 people, injuring tens of thousands more and 
destroying or damaging around 755,000 houses. The second, an aftershock which struck as 
the relief operation was in full swing on 12 May, was slightly less severe at 7.3 but still 
resulted in several hundred deaths, adding more strain to an already highly difficult situation.  
Although the government and agencies operating in Nepal had been preparing for ‘the big 
one’ for some time, the relatively light toll brought about in urban centres such as Kathmandu 
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meant that many consider the country to have had a lucky escape. However, as with the 
conflict that preceded it, residents of rural areas bore the brunt of the tragedy, suffering the 
highest damage and presenting the greatest challenge to relief and reconstruction efforts. As 
the figures below demonstrate, there is a significant overlap between conflict and earthquake 
affected areas to the north of Kathmandu (including Rasuwa, Gorkha, Dhading, 
Sindhupalchowk and Nuwakot). Although the areas in the far West that were most affected 
by the conflict were spared the worst of the earthquake, places such as Rolpa and Rukum 


















The international response to the earthquake was significant – as well as mobilising 
immediate relief efforts, a donor conference held in June 2015 raised pledges of US$ 4.4 
billion towards reconstruction efforts. However, the reconstruction effort was severely 
hampered by a crippling five month-long fuel blockade by members of the country’s Madhesi 
community protesting their under-representation in the newly adopted constitution. This 
prevented key imports of fuel from across the border with India, severely hampering the 
economy and leading to shortages of medicine, cooking gas and vital reconstruction 
materials. Nearly two years on from the earthquake, at the time this research was carried out, 
there was widespread concern at the pace of reconstruction, both from internationally and in 
affected communities. In a survey of 2,100 affected households carried out by the UN in 
January 2017, 55 per cent of respondents still felt that their main reconstruction needs were 
not being addressed, and only 49 per cent felt that reconstruction was making progress.12 
These perceptions are mirrored by slow progress in the official housing reconstruction 
programme. By September 2017 construction had started on only 87,525 of the 631,781 
eligible households, with fewer than 20,000 having been reported as completed.13 
 
These two events, and perhaps even more significantly their aftermaths, have had an 
immense impact on the political, social and economic landscape of the country. They have 
laid bare tensions around challenging issues of inclusion, land rights and poverty, they have 
led to an influx of external actors and influences, particularly from the Western donor 
architecture, and they have repeatedly challenged the ways in which power is embedded in 
Nepalese government and society. Despite this the two processes – the post-conflict and post-
disaster – have rarely been considered together in the Nepalese context. Nonetheless, there 
are compelling reasons to interrogate them side by side, not least the growing body of 
literature interrogating the link between climate change and related disasters and conflict,14 
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how conflict affects communities’ resilience to climate and natural hazard related disasters,15 
and to what extent NHrDs make conflict more likely.16 Asking to what extent recent the two 
reconstruction processes have been related to each other helps us to better understand the 
context in which the earthquake response has occurred, and elucidates the considerable 
practical and theoretical linkages between them, as will be discussed in the next section.17 
Increasingly researchers focused on responses to such humanitarian crises are highlighting 
the need to pay ‘attention to ongoing historical and political processes in the design of 
recovery programming’,18 and underlining the potential of ‘combining disciplines’ in order to 
develop effective responses to rebuilding in the wake of conflict and disaster.19  It is for this 
reason that this paper proposes to explore the links between post-conflict and post-disaster 
reconstruction in Nepal, with a view to understanding to what extent the former has 
influenced the latter, and whether any salient lessons have been learned between the two 
processes.  
 
Two sides of the same coin? Understanding post-conflict and post-disaster 
reconstruction together 
The existing academic literature has evolved in recent years to suggest there are 
significant links between natural hazard related disasters and violent conflicts, and between 
the reconstruction that follows these events. As we shall discuss below, both processes are 
concerned with vulnerabilities, and both often deal with the same issues, using similar tools 
and often involving the same institutional actors. We can also consider PDR and PCR as both 
forming part of the wider liberal architecture of humanitarian intervention, with all the 
normative meaning and baggage that this might entail. However, this does not make the two 
processes interchangeable. As we shall see, there are important differences in the nature of 
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these reconstruction processes, from the nature of the triggering event and the psychological 
impact of this on affected communities, to specific types of activities unique to PDR and 
PCR, to the willingness of donors to get involved. It would be a mistake, then, to believe that 
one type of intervention will address the other’s needs by default – a more nuanced approach 
is necessary. 
 
Whilst noting essential differences between the two types of crisis, the ‘complex political 
emergencies’ literature of the 1990s noted that a key element of the nexus between post-
disaster and post-conflict was around how armed conflicts and natural hazard related 
disasters could exacerbate the conditions for each other from a vulnerability perspective.20 
The most vulnerable groups in society are often affected by a ‘layering’ of natural hazard 
related disasters and social conflict or ongoing violence,21 with victims of the most severe 
disasters from Aceh, to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Haiti also having suffered the effects of serious 
or prolonged conflict. This layering effect makes the communities concerned even less able 
to respond to the impact of a natural hazard related disaster,22 whilst the effects of disaster on 
the availability of resources and the resilience of a society can make conflict more likely (see 
Uexkull’s work on drought and conflict, or Peters, Keen and Mitchell for an overview of the 
coincidence of conflict and disaster).23 This represents what Vivekananda et al. see as the 
‘negative cycle’ in which conflict induced fragility increases vulnerability to climate change 
and natural hazard related disasters, which in turn diminishes human security and fans the 
flames of conflict.24 As Nel and Righarts noted ‘natural disasters significantly increase the 
risk of violent civil conflict both in the short and medium term, specifically in low and 
middle-income countries that have intermediate to high levels of inequality, mixed political 
regimes, and sluggish economic growth’.25 At the same time violent conflict drastically 
diminishes a country’s ability to prevent, mitigate and respond to disasters, exacerbating the 
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vulnerabilities that turn hazards into disasters, such as economic capacity and resources, 
effective governance and institutions, and community participation and accountability (see 
Twigg for further discussion of the characteristics of disaster resilient communities).26 The 
layering and interaction between disaster and conflict vis à vis physical, socio-economic and 
political vulnerabilities therefore mean that it is not always feasible, or advisable, to attempt 
to treat post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction as two separate processes. Moreover, 
focusing on the links between the two – be that by applying lessons learned from one process 
in the other, or integrating activities from PDR into PCR processes and vice versa – presents 
an opportunity to intervene in this negative symbiotic relationship, to break the mutually 
reinforcing circle in which both conflict and disaster increase communities’ vulnerability and 
lessen their ability to withstand, or prevent, the next round of suffering. 
 
The extant literature highlights some links and overlaps between PCR and PDR, as 
contemporary approaches these processes share a holistic outlook on rebuilding in the 
aftermath of crisis. Although both maintain an important focus on the challenges of physical 
reconstruction, particularly as this pertains to infrastructure and shelter, they also seek to 
address a broader range of issues relating to economic and social reconstruction, such as 
restoring livelihoods and strengthening governance and legal structures.27 Of course, whilst 
there are significant similarities between the processes of post-conflict and post-disaster 
reconstruction it is also important to acknowledge their differences. Whilst much can be 
learned and shared between them, it is clear that these activities are not interchangeable. 
Albala-Bertrand argues that the nature of the ‘triggering event’ that brings about the disaster 
has crucial consequences for the nature of the disaster, distinguishing the exogenous nature of 
the triggering event in an NHrD from the endogenous nature of most conflict causes.28 This is 
an important point, although his argument that ‘the institutional endogeneity of these 
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triggering events, associated to society’s proneness and vulnerability, is what makes socially 
made disasters more complex than natural ones’ comes perilously close to falling into the 
trap of ignoring the political reasons through which a natural hazard becomes a disaster, and 
underplays the vast complexity of NHrD’s (of which Nepal is a prime example).29 It is 
imperative to acknowledge that some concerns that arise in post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts, such as DDR of ex-combatants or the implementation of a conflict-ending political 
settlement, are not present in post-disaster works (though the activities used to achieve them, 
like work to restore livelihoods, may be similar in some cases). In addition, the trauma 
caused to affected communities by conflict and NHrD is most often quite different, due to the 
nature of the crisis, the speed of its onset and the way that blame for the suffering produced is 
attributed. As Simpson puts it ‘a house collapsing has a different death spell to the attack of 
an angry and anonymous mob’.30 This in turn has an impact on the kind of community 
mobilisation witnessed following conflict and disaster. The moment of apparent unity and 
upsurge in mutual support between communities in disaster affected countries is a well-
documented phenomenon, what Oliver-Smith and Hoffman called the ‘brotherhood of 
pain’,31 and Solnit the ‘extraordinary communities’ of disaster.32 This rise in volunteerism 
and solidarity in the immediate aftermath may also happen within certain groups following 
conflict (for example, support by neighbouring or diaspora members of the same ethnic or 
religious group), but this lacks the unifying force often witnessed after disaster, albeit for 
varying amounts of time.  
 
Another key characteristic that is often attributed to post-conflict reconstruction to mark it 
out as different from post-disaster reconstruction is the apparently political nature of the 
former. This, it is suggested, makes donors more likely to intervene in the seemingly 
apolitical context of a natural hazard related disaster when they might be more wary of doing 
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so in the highly politicised aftermath of violent conflict.33 Ilan Kelman’s work on ‘disaster 
diplomacy’, however unsuccessful he shows this to be, demonstrates how the post-disaster 
moment presents a perceived opportunity for even political foes to offer support to affected 
countries.34 Certainly, this distinction seems to be quite widely adopted, and influences the 
way that many stakeholders perceive and react to conflicts and NHrDs. De Torrente has 
criticised attempts to challenge the positioning of humanitarian action as apolitical. He argues 
that attempts to link humanitarian action to the political goals of the international community, 
such as peace-building or development, ‘sacrifice’ the neutrality, impartiality and 
independence of humanitarian action (often known as the ‘humanitarian imperative’).35 
Humanitarian action’s claims to impartiality have been criticised, though – as Hillhorst 
argues, whilst the humanitarian imperative is undoubtedly important, in practice it is far more 
ambiguous and politically contingent than its proponents might hope.36  
This paper argues that to see post-conflict as political (acts caused by man) and post-
disaster as apolitical (acts of God) is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of disasters. 
Here again the literature suggests this to be a false dichotomy, and one that prevents effective 
interventions that break the cycle of conflict, vulnerability and disaster. Adopting Pelling’s 
definition of natural hazard related disaster as the ‘outcome of hazard and vulnerability 
coinciding’, it is clear that it is the vulnerability of certain groups – an altogether manmade 
and thus political situation – that makes a hazard into a disaster.37 That is to say, all disasters, 
whether they stem from an earthquake or a conflict, are essentially manmade. There is a 
widespread acceptance amongst disaster researchers today that so called ‘natural disasters’ 
are not natural.38 Interventions must therefore address these human-made and eminently 
political vulnerabilities – poverty and inequality, for example – if they are to be effective. In 
this way, post-disaster reconstruction is just as political as post-conflict reconstruction, even 
if it is commonly perceived not to be the case.  
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The aims of both processes also differ in significant ways. Post-conflict reconstruction 
aims, in the words of the World Bank, ‘to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after 
hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development’.39 The five key 
dimensions of security, governance, socio-economic recovery, transitional justice and 
reconciliation are all considered part of the post-conflict reconstruction process and often 
used interchangeably with peace-building.40 These are pursued via a wide range of specific 
programmes such as the rebuilding of infrastructure, services and housing, return of displaced 
populations, re-establishment of institutional structures for governances, reintegration of ex-
combatants, clearance of landmines, trust building between divided communities, and the 
revitalisation of local employment and livelihoods. Post-disaster reconstruction, on the other 
hand, is today governed by the mantra ‘build back better’ now ingrained in key documents 
such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. This approach recognises the 
exceptional – and fleeting – circumstances that come together in the post-crisis landscape, 
and encourages the planners and agencies involved in the reconstruction process to make the 
most of the opportunities for improvement that these rare circumstances present.41 In both 
cases, however, the post-crisis context is seen as a moment of opportunity to improve on 
what went before, and to address the social, economic and physical structures that contributed 
to the onset of conflict or disaster. This can be seen as an acknowledgement that it is 
impossible to return to the status quo ante following conflict or disaster, given the impact of 
people’s experiences of conflict and reconstruction, and the very passage of time.42 To 
attempt to do so would result in reconstruction that papered over the cracks (physical and 
psychosocial) caused by the crisis, and was perceived as inauthentic by local communities.43 
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Both PCR and PDR interventions from the international sphere are also strongly 
connected to the aims and methods of the international liberal peace architecture, and as such 
are linked by their normative underpinnings and key methods, as well as by the criticisms 
levelled at them. Although PCR has long been acknowledged as an activity at the heart of the 
liberal peace-building agenda, there is an increasing recognition that a great deal of PDR 
interventions can also be seen in this light.44 This is not only due to the fact that the cast of 
characters carrying out these activities at the international level are often the same, but also 
because of the growing number of cases in which PDR activities have been used to try and 
assist peace-building aims, not always successfully (the cases of Sri Lanka and Aceh 
following the 2004 tsunami have prompted a wave of scholarship on this).45 As well as 
bringing together many of the same actors and institutions, the liberal architecture of PCR 
and PDR also employs similar methods. For example, practitioners intervening in the 
aftermath of conflict and disaster alike increasingly turn to participatory methods.46 
Stakeholder participation in reconstruction projects is widely held to have a range of 
significant benefits to the rebuilding process, including better information gathering,47 the 
empowerment of local communities,48 and even an opportunity to help affected communities 
deal with their trauma.49  It is no surprise, then, that stakeholder participation and 
consultation has become a buzzword in reconstruction after both conflict and disaster. This, 
along with the focus in both processes on community resilience and ‘bottom up’ thinking, can 
be viewed as part of the ‘local turn’ that has come to characterise the liberal peace-building 
architecture in recent years.50 . This paper will seek to understand what are the barriers, then, 
that have prevented the two processes from being linked in practice (for example, by PDR 
processes to explicitly pursue goals linked to conflict, or by PCR processes contributing to 
disaster risk reduction goals) when there appears to be ample evidence for doing so in theory. 
 
18 
Missed opportunities? Interrogating the disconnect between post-conflict and post-
earthquake processes in Nepal 
If the question we posed at the beginning of this research was ‘to what extent has Nepal’s 
experience of post-conflict reconstruction influenced its approach to post-disaster 
reconstruction?’ the answer very quickly became quite clear during our interviews. It has not. 
Time and again, interviewees from across the spectrum of Government representatives,51 
NGOs,52 donors, 53 and International Organisations 54 that we engaged with informed us that 
the two processes were entirely separate, to the extent that several stated they believed it had 
‘never occurred’ to anyone to link the two 55, or to attempt to apply lessons learned from the 
post-conflict reconstruction process in the aftermath of the earthquake. Even the rare 
interlocutors we spoke to who had attempted to integrate a systematic conflict-sensitive 
approach to their post-earthquake work still saw this process as fundamentally separate from 
the post-conflict reconstruction activities that had been taking place since 2006. 56 This was 
despite a wide acknowledgement, particularly amongst international representatives, that 
many of the key challenges that had bedevilled the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement continued to occupy a prominent role in their considerations when planning 
post-earthquake interventions.57 
In this light, it becomes important to try and understand why there has been such a 
singular reluctance to link the two processes or to integrate learning from Nepal’s decade 
long experience of post-conflict reconstruction into the huge effort to rebuild after the 2015 
earthquake. The response to this is twofold, as will be explored in greater detail below. 
Firstly, there appears to be a wish on the part of many stakeholders to avoid what they 
perceive as the risk of politicising the PDR process. This desire has led to the deliberate 
distancing of post-earthquake activities from the distinctly political activities and issues 
pursued in the post-conflict. Secondly, it appears that numerous stakeholders believe that the 
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kind of reconstruction that takes place following a disaster such as an earthquake is so 
fundamentally different to that which follows a conflict, that there is little value in 
considering them together. And yet, as we shall demonstrate, the nature of the reconstruction 
that has taken place in Nepal since 2015 (or has failed to take place, as the case may be) 
demonstrates the process to be innately political and intricately entwined with the very same 
issues and activities the post-conflict reconstruction process attempted to address. This 
investigation views reconstruction as both ‘Political’ (situated in the framework and practice 
of politics of Nepal) and ‘political’ (bound up with questions of power, inclusion and 
inequality). Crucially, and as discussed in greater detail in the final section of the paper, it 
understands that the discourse around both types of politics in Nepal today has in large part 
been constituted and framed by the post-conflict settlement. As we argue in the final section 
of the paper, the entire process is taking place within – and being strongly affected by – a 
political context which is wholly a product of the tensions and compromises of the as-yet 
unresolved post-conflict polity.  
 
Act of god or act of man – disputing the political nature of the post-disaster 
It did not recognise who is well off, who is poor, who is marginalised… excluded 
people, it doesn’t recognise, the earthquake didn’t recognise.58 
The quote above perfectly encapsulates one popular narrative identified during this 
research, the unifying, indiscriminate and ultimately apolitical nature of the earthquake, and 
by extension, of the relief and reconstruction that followed it. To many the earthquake 
represented a force outside Nepal’s tumultuous and often controversial politics, one that took 
no notice of the faultlines of caste, gender, ethnicity or wealth that define life, and 
opportunity, for many Nepalese citizens. They pointed to the outpouring of national unity that 
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followed the disaster as proof that this event was above politics. As one representative of the 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction put it ‘Disaster is something that everyone comes 
together. You can forget any past, any disparity or party to the conflict, we’re trying to save 
one another and trying to come together and work for the common good’.59 
The initial weeks following the disaster were repeatedly recalled as a time when Nepalese 
society came together across political, social or ethnic lines to work together, occupying large 
numbers of young people in volunteering and encouraging many urban residents to engage 
with their impoverished rural counterparts, many for the first time. As Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman noted, this behavior is ‘not at all atypical of disaster victims in many cultural 
contexts’, though the duration of this sentiment is bounded in time and often challenged by 
emergency relief and reconstruction activities.60 For one participant, this harked back to a 
better time, a ‘social harmony’ that existed before people were ‘indoctrinated’ by the conflict 
and its aftermath.61 In fact, the phrase ‘social harmony’ has a specific meaning within 
Nepalese political discourse, and is often used in contrast with the idea of inclusivity. The 
demand for social justice via greater inclusivity in Nepalese society originates in the Maoist’s 
wartime aims of advancing the rights of indigenous groups, lower caste citizens and women 
in the civil war, and was subsequently enshrined in the CPA. These aims are summarised in 
clause 3.5 of the CPA, which states: 
In order to end discriminations based on class, ethnicity, language, gender, culture, 
religion and region and to address the problems of women, Dalit, indigenous 
people, ethnic minorities (Janajatis), Tarai communities (Madheshis), oppressed, 
neglected and minority communities and the backward areas by deconstructing the 
current centralised and unitary structure, the state shall be restructured in an 
inclusive, democratic and forward looking manner.  
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The idea of social harmony represents the social contract that was in place before that, in 
which the acronymic ideal suggested by one interviewee of ‘Never Ending Peace And 
Love’62 was maintained by conforming to a unitary and hierarchical national identity defined 
by the monarchy and high caste elites. In this vision inclusivity is, in fact, a threat to social 
harmony (as based on a homogenous and stratified national identity), just as politics is a 
threat to post-earthquake unity. 
The National Reconstruction Authority (NRA), the government body set up to oversee the 
earthquake reconstruction process, was also at pains to ensure their response steered away 
from the kind of thorny political issues they feared would slow the process down. They 
prioritised a ‘blanket’ approach to the delivery of relief and reconstruction aid. 63 Under this 
all earthquake affected households were provided with the same level of support, such as the 
first of three proposed tranches of funding to rebuild earthquake resistant houses, regardless 
of their relative wealth, social exclusion or the size of the destroyed or damaged property. 
This, they felt, was the fairest way to quickly deliver help to all that needed it, and could be 
seen as reflecting the ideal of humanitarian action as neutral, impartial, independent and 
(above all) swift. 64 Although, as Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah remind us, the 
humanitarian imperative is rarely as free of politics as it may seem, and this ‘separation from 
politics is difficult to maintain in practice, as humanitarian action invariably shapes and 
influences the structures and processes that cause vulnerability and suffering: humanitarian 
action has clear political consequences, irrespective of whether it has political aims at the 
outset’. 65 
The choice to use a blanket approach instead of a needs-based one was in some ways 
pragmatic, and acknowledged the way that political infighting might otherwise slow down 
the distribution of desperately needed aid. However, as shall become clear later in this 
section, it was also part of a deliberate decision by the Nepalese authorities to put an end to 
22 
programming centred around apparently political issues such as identity and inequality. As 
one international donor representative noted ‘Targeted programming, identity based or 
targeted programming is absolutely unacceptable now in Nepal. The bureaucracy just will not 
let you do it’. 66 Another representative of an International Organisation described the 
difficulties they had faced trying to get the NRA to approve a questionnaire that 
acknowledged the diversity of indigenous groups living in an affected area, instead of using 
the catch-all term Janajati. 67 In this way the line of separation between ‘political’ issues 
related to the conflict and CPA and the ‘apolitical’ earthquake has once again been 
reinforced, even though the vulnerabilities at the heart of the disaster are innately political.68 
The Nepalese government’s reluctance to acknowledge caste and ethnicity-based inequalities 
in its response may be born of the concern that to do otherwise could risk stirring up a 
hornet’s nest of identity based hostilities at a sensitive time. However, this approach ignores 
the fact that some groups were disproportionately affected by the earthquake, both due to 
their physical location (such as Tamang, Newar and other hill Janajati populations) and due 
to their lack of socio-economic resources relative to higher caste groups. In effect, choosing 
to ignore pernicious inequalities in their response to the earthquake could in fact be 
understood as reflecting the ‘social harmony’ approach described above. 
For all that some actors view post-disaster reconstruction in Nepal as apolitical, in reality 
this is far from the case. For one thing, the mechanisms and processes of post-disaster 
reconstruction represent a rich political and economic resource that local political elites are 
competing to capture, politicising the whole process, something which local NGOs were 
particularly wary of.69 This is true from the very top of the NRA, whose CEO is a political 
appointment, and has already seen three changes in leadership (brought about by a change in 
government) since its inception in the summer of 2015.70 It is also true in the structure and 
functioning of the NRA, particularly its relationships with other Ministries and government 
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bodies,  which one observer characterised as ‘left deliberately being opaque’ to ensure that 
‘the NRA would essentially come last in that hierarchy’.71 For those not in power at any 
given moment, slowing down the work of the NRA has been an effective way to prove that 
their political rivals are unfit to govern. The politicisation of the mechanisms of earthquake 
reconstruction in fact reaches all the way to the level of delivery, where political parties 
jockeyed to include their supporters on beneficiary lists (as one interviewee wryly noted 
‘everyone has their list in their pocket.  They come with their own list’72) and there was an 
open acknowledgement that local NGOs working as partners had their own clear affiliations 
to the parties.73 It is difficult, then, to claim that PDR is apolitical when its apparatus is 
defined by political bargaining from root to branch.  
Perhaps more significantly, this framing of the post-disaster as stubbornly apolitical also 
represents a deliberate attempt on the part of the government, and perhaps some members of 
the international community, to draw a line under the post-conflict peace-building phase of 
Nepal’s history and definitively move the focus to the earthquake reconstruction.74 Although 
this may at first glance seem like a natural response to the most pressing issue of the day, 
numerous participants informed us that this shift away from rights-based or advocacy work 
related to the post-conflict had in fact begun in 2013, well before the earthquake struck.75 
This observation was supported in meetings with representatives of the Ministry for Peace 
and Reconstruction – the focal point of post-conflict work in the country – who informed us 
that all their goals had already been achieved, and the Ministry was ready to be dissolved. 76 
This assessment on the state of progress towards achieving the ideals set out in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not shared by local NGOs or international actors.77 
Nor does it reflect the approach held by theorists such as Lederach and Dudouet who see 
peace as cyclical and continuously remade, rather than something that could be declared 
‘done’.78 It certainly appears as though the Nepalese authorities seized on the earthquake as 
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an opportunity to refocus attention away from the difficult political issues of the post-conflict 
settlement (which, in the words of one donor country representative, they ‘never wanted to 
deal with’ anyway)79 to something perceived as less political and more unifying. Certainly 
the way in which the new constitution was ‘fast-tracked’ through in the aftermath of the 
earthquake, after nearly a decade of wrangling in the Constituent Assembly had failed to 
resolve key issues, suggests a readiness on the part of the Nepalese elites to use this 
opportunity to lay the work of the post-conflict to rest. In this way the vulnerabilities exposed 
in the post-disaster response, and the nature of the government’s reaction, amply support 
characterizations of these kinds of disasters as politically significant.  
 
‘Totally separate’: bridging the perception gap between PCR and PDR 
Having a lot of experience in the post-conflict reconstruction, do you see any 
similarities between the two processes? Are there areas you think that the post-
earthquake could have learned from the work you have been doing? 
Maybe the technical designs, but nothing else.80 
A striking element to emerge from the interviews carried out for this research was the 
extent to which stakeholders in Nepal frequently considered the mandates and activities of 
post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction to be fundamentally different from one 
another.81 The total lack of collaboration or experience sharing between the NRA and the 
Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction, the bodies tasked with overseeing post-earthquake 
and post-conflict reconstruction respectively, was emblematic of this approach. 
Representatives of both bodies underlined that it was the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction’s job to rebuild the public buildings damaged in the conflict (such as police 
stations and bridges) and the NRA’s job to focus on the private property, the houses, 
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destroyed by the earthquake.82 Whilst it is true that the housing reconstruction that makes up 
such a large part of the NRA’s daily work did not figure at all in the MPR’s mandate, it 
seems reductive to suggest that these are the limits to the two bodies’ work. Indeed, this view 
of reconstruction obscures the work on economic and social reconstruction at the heart of the 
mandate of each institution. As one local researcher pointed out, the narrative that PDR in 
Nepal was simply about rebuilding private housing has not come about by accident, but is 
part of a deliberate framing of the post-disaster, warning that when ‘actors create that 
narrative, it’s picked up by the people as well’.83 
The Nepalese government was not the only stakeholder for whom systematic knowledge 
and experience sharing about PDR and PCR programming was not prioritised. Several donor 
agencies explained that even though they could clearly see the value of linking the two 
processes, the structure of their organisations, and the nature of the ‘machinery’ of 
international disaster response, made this near impossible.84 In many institutions these 
activities continue to be managed and implemented from within different departments and 
viewed as essentially different activities from one another. As one donor agency 
representative, a post-disaster specialist, explained  
Now I’m thinking, if we would like that kind of conflict transformational approach in a 
reconstruction project, it’s possible, but I think it’s going to be really complicated because 
we have to ask another section at the headquarters to have the analysis through their conflict 
related lenses and blah blah blah. And then these two sections definitely have totally different 
ideas. And then the co-ordination would be really difficult and anyway co-ordination for 
BBBs [Build Back Better] are too much. So, yeah, it’s going to be super challenging.85 
And yet, as established above, the communities these actors seek to help have often been 
effected by a layering of disaster and conflict, resulting in the kinds of extreme vulnerability 
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that turns a hazard into a disaster.86 If the international architecture of relief and 
reconstruction is to meet its commitments to ‘build back better’ then they surely need to 
move beyond the working structures that currently envisage post-disaster and post-conflict 
response as fundamentally separate activities. As Vivekananda et al. point out, academic 
research could provide a vital first step in addressing this tendency to consider disaster and 
conflict in silos, as could encouraging development practitioners and agencies to rethink their 
structures.87 
More than just a structural issue, though, this view of post-conflict and post-disaster 
activities as completely unrelated once again reflects the policy of the Nepalese authorities to 
seize on the post-earthquake as a moment of opportunity to reduce work linked to the post-
conflict settlement and refocus attention on the earthquake reconstruction, perceived as less 
political. This can be clearly witnessed in the increasingly rigid line being drawn by the 
Nepalese government between so-called ‘hard’ programming, for example infrastructure 
provision, and ‘soft’ programmes, such as advocacy and rights-based work, which the 
government recently mandated must comprise no more than 30 per cent of a donor’s 
activities. Although respondents overwhelmingly recognised that there is a massive need for 
physical and infrastructure reconstruction in the country – the challenges are immense, with 
hundreds of thousands of houses still to rebuild in a deeply challenging terrain – several 
expressed deep concerns that this ‘anti-soft’ policy undermined their ability to rebuild 
effectively and in a holistic manner.88 They pointed out that many of the central challenges of 
reconstruction identified in the NRA’s flagship document, the Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment, such as gender equality, social inclusion and social protection, could not be 
addressed through the provision of infrastructure alone. Some went further, suggesting that 
the government had ‘capitalised’ on the earthquake response to increase ‘hard’ programming 
at the expense of ‘soft’ because ‘rights-based programming is a threat to them. Because 
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you’re increasing community capacity to make demands on the government.’89 Interestingly 
this concern echoes Krampe’s findings regarding the impact of the introduction of small 
hydro-electric projects in some villages in rural Nepal. Rather than increasing the state’s 
legitimacy, he explains ‘the construction of the micro-hydropower project has facilitated 
interactions within both villages that have resulted in more local autonomy. This increase in 
local autonomy has in turn inhibited a positive effect on the legitimacy of Nepali state 
actors’.90 Some interviewees suggested that these demands go unmet due to simple lack of 
capacity. However, others argued that this is because despite the all the experiences of the 
conflict and its aftermath, successive Nepalese governments have continued to represent a 
small minority which is unwilling to surrender any more of their power and influence, and 
fearful of ‘soft’ programming that might further embolden non-elites (IV291). As one head of 
a local NGO memorably put it ‘no amount of research or reporting or advocacy will change 
this; that the important decisions of Nepal are made by four, hill Brahmin males’ (IV492).  
Seen in this light, the move to keep the lucrative business of rebuilding after the 
earthquake firmly separate from the difficult, and controversial, post-conflict questions 
around identity and inclusion could be interpreted as a way of protecting the position and 
influence of elite actors in Nepal. To those researchers who have theorised the path 
dependency of disaster outcomes this should come as no surprise. Instead of providing a 
clean slate or catalyst for change, the aftermath of a disaster often produces an ‘accelerated 
status quo’, accentuating existing political and social stresses.93 
This is firmly to the detriment of post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal. The most 
important and complex issues of the reconstruction process identified in the government’s 
own assessments – land, social inclusion, gender equality – are inherently political. They 
cannot be addressed, nor can effective reconstruction in all its forms (social and economic, as 
well as physical), without understanding and engaging with the political context. Although 
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there appears to be a recognition of this within the NRA itself, who told us that social 
reconstruction was ‘the biggest and hardest’ challenge they faced,94 it is undermined by 
restrictions on ‘soft’ programmes, and the persistent perception that post-earthquake activities 
are fundamentally different to the extensive work carried out in the aftermath of the country’s 
long civil war. In actual fact, as a comparison of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the Post Disaster Needs Assessment demonstrates, many of the issues at the heart of the 
peace agreement, such as land reform and inclusivity, are also central to the challenge of 
building back better today. 
 
‘Dysfunction by design’ or ‘the order of disorder’ – the impact of the post-conflict polity 
Beyond overlaps in activities and the centrality of certain key issues to PDR and PCR 
processes in Nepal, however, there is a larger, structural issue that makes it impossible to 
understand the post-earthquake context of Nepal without also referring to its post-conflict 
status. That is to say, that the conflict outcomes – as yet unresolved – created a particular 
political space in which Nepalese earthquake reconstruction is taking place, and which 
produces distinct effects on this process. This is no surprise, given that one of the Maoists’ 
primary aims throughout the conflict, and a key bone of contention with the government, was 
to bring about a restructuring of the state.95 Understanding and acknowledging this context 
would make reconstruction more effective and more responsive to its local context.  
Some observers we spoke to characterised this situation as ‘dysfunction by design’ – the 
idea that the government has a vested interest in making the reconstruction process as opaque 
and slow as possible, in order to reinforce their control over the power and resources of the 
centre. 96 Seen in this light, the painfully slow progress of reconstruction could be understood 
as a strategic choice to maintain the distance between elites and society as a whole, and 
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eventually lessen the demands on the centre both by encouraging earthquake victims to take 
reconstruction into their own hands. Numerous interviewees expressed the belief that most 
housing reconstruction would eventually be done on an ad hoc basis by homeowners, outside 
of the NRA’s formal programme, by a public accustomed to not relying on state services.97 
This would ensure their focus remains on the pressing concerns of shelter and reconstruction 
assistance, rather than the pernicious and complicated questions of identity, inclusion and 
inequality. Such an interpretation would also consider repeated efforts to ensure that the 
‘apolitical’ activities of PDR are perceived as wholly different to the ‘political’ questions of 
PCR, as set out in the previous sections, as another element of this strategy to maintain the 
power of the centre. 
However, seen through another lens this situation can be understood not as a cynical 
governance strategy, but as a product of the as-yet undecided nature of the political space in 
Nepal today, the ‘order of disorder’ in the words of one interviewee.98 The end of the civil 
war in Nepal brought about a definitive end to the old order, with the suspension of the 
monarchy, the institution of a Constituent Assembly and the inclusion of the rebel Maoists 
into mainstream politics. And yet, to paraphrase Gramsci, whilst the former regime has surely 
ended, the new one has yet to be fully born. Nepalese politics is defined by instability and 
short termism. Two consecutive Constituent Assemblies laboured from 2008 and 2013 to try 
to define the framework of government in Nepal without success, until the promulgation of a 
constitution was ‘fast tracked’ in the aftermath of the earthquake, prompting widespread 
violent protest. Governments rarely last a year, with the resulting alternations in power 
resonating throughout the structures of power from Ministry to Village Development 
Committee level. This situation – both product and symptom of Nepal’s post-conflict 
settlement – clearly resonates with Bauman’s interpretation of Gramsci’s interregnum, which 
he described as; 
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Extraordinary situations in which the extant legal frame of social order loses its grip and 
can hold no longer, whereas a new frame, made to the measure of newly emerged conditions 
responsible for making the old frame useless, is still at the designing stage, has not yet been 
fully assembled, or is not strong enough to be put in its place.99  
This space of political uncertainty is producing very real effects on the post disaster 
reconstruction process. The NRA has been hamstrung by the removal and reinstatement of 
politically affiliated appointees at its head. As one local academic asserted, the NRA is 
‘directly co-constituted with the post conflict politics’, which is the politics of constant 
alternation.100 Concerns emerge from nearly every stakeholder involved in post-disaster 
reconstruction, but particularly from local actors, that the delivery of the programme is bound 
up with political parties.101 On a very simple level, the transfer of institutional memory and 
learning is rendered near impossible against a background of constant political churn.102 That 
this space of political uncertainty is a direct result of the conflict in Nepal and the settlement 
that followed it puts lie to the idea, oft repeated, that post-conflict and post-disaster processes 
are entirely separate and have no bearing on each other. Once again, this supports a view of 
disaster responses as both ‘politically revelatory’,103 and prone to reflecting a more acute and 
pressing version of the political and social trends that existed before the disaster struck and 
that contributed to the way that a natural hazard to disaster.104  In fact, every action taken 
under the aegis of post-earthquake reconstruction is being carried out in a context that is 
specific to Nepal’s post-conflict, buffeted and reshaped by the tensions and negotiations that 
continue to define this moment in the country’s history. The politics of disaster in Nepal are 
the politics of its post-conflict – the two are so intricately linked that to try and treat them 




This research has demonstrated a very real and problematic gap between rhetoric and 
practice when it comes to the interaction of post-disaster reconstruction and post-conflict 
reconstruction processes. The academic literature increasingly points to the interaction of 
these two processes from a vulnerability perspective, to the similarity in a number of their 
activities and processes, and to the tension between the way both processes can trigger the 
introduction of new paradigms, whilst also representing the concentrated expression of pre-
existing social and political context. Similarly, many interviewees acknowledged how vital 
questions at the heart of Nepal’s post-conflict reconstruction period have also proved key to 
the country’s post-disaster challenges. But despite this, the reality of reconstruction on the 
ground since the earthquakes in 2015 shows that the two processes are not being linked. In 
fact, PCR and PDR processes have been kept in silos, largely due to structural and political 
reasons. 
And yet, for all that some actors may be reluctant to acknowledge it, PDR in Nepal is 
intensely political, and bound up with many of the key political challenges of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement – land, identity, inequality, rights, and power. Policy-
makers and practitioners in Nepal are reluctant to ‘politicise’ PDR by explicitly linking it to 
the PCR period, drawing on the knowledge and expertise that has been built up over ten years 
of CPA implementation, fearing that this may further delay and already sluggish process. But 
this means that the impact of PDR on power relations and conflict drivers is not being 
acknowledged. This might help to explain why the year after the earthquake the country 
witnessed a significant flare in violence in the restive Terai region, followed by a devastating 
fuel blockade. Actions carried out in the name of earthquake response – notably the fast-
tracked constitution – have caused consternation in marginalised communities and rocked the 
fragile foundations of peace in Nepal. 
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Understanding reconstruction as political is important; it underlines the fact that 
reconstruction is social as much as physical, with power relations and social mores subject to 
a process of rebuilding, as well as the physical fabric that has been destroyed. Such an 
approach sees processes of destruction and reconstruction as two sides of the same coin, and 
deplores what Flint and Kirsch describe as the ‘false dichotomy’ between war and peace, 
before and after,105 and a linear view of peace and conflict also rejected by Lederach.106 
Reconstruction is also ‘Political’: In the past decade a growing subfield of disaster studies has 
highlighted that disasters are not only created by political forces, but create important 
political repercussions.107 Olson and Gawronski underline the function of disasters as 
‘politically revelatory events’ which expose existing vulnerabilities and the quality of 
political leadership to affected communities.108 As this research has demonstrated, in Nepal 
PDR is both linked to politics as it relates to the government and political parties, and as it 
relates to the perennial political challenges of equality, citizenship and inclusion. What is 
more, both of these types of politics are directly linked to the country’s post-conflict context, 
and the implementation of its PCR processes and structures.  
Responses to disaster or conflict, then, should not be seen as purely technical or purely 
political, nor should their field of action be viewed as a clean slate. Instead they should take 
into account the full gamut of social relations and political context that were in place before, 
during and after the onset of the emergency. This approach has increasingly been 
acknowledged by academics (as evidenced by many of the articles referenced earlier in the 
text) as well as by many researchers and policy-makers, who have advocated, for example, 
for conflict sensitive approaches to post-disaster reconstruction (see publications by the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery or the Humanitarian Practice Network 
for examples of this). However, as this research has demonstrated, whilst these links are 
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being made in theory, when it comes to practical applications and policy making on the 
ground, PDR and PCR are still often seen as fundamentally unrelated processes.  
Failing to acknowledge the politics of post-disaster reconstruction not only undermines 
progress made in addressing conflict drivers over the past decade, it also means that PDR is 
destined to fall short of its goals. At a practical level reconstruction has been hamstrung by 
political alternation at the centre and politicisation at the point of delivery. Mistrust of ‘soft’ 
reconstruction (seen as too political) means that vital social and economic reconstruction is 
not taking place, and a reluctance to countenance targeted programming that acknowledges 
structural inequalities means the most vulnerable communities are not being adequately 
supported. At a conceptual level, the focus of disaster work continues to move towards risk 
reduction, prevention and preparedness (as encapsulated in the Sendai Framework), and 
building the resilience of communities is at the heart of this. This raises an important question 
for Nepal: How can community resilience be built without addressing unresolved political 
questions around inequality and inclusion? The tabling (although unsuccessful) of a 
constitutional amendment aimed at resolving some of the concerns raised by Madhesi 
community in August 2017, and the holding of long awaited local elections in the following 
November, show the country continuing to take steps to implement the peace process agenda 
and ‘transition into federal, secular and inclusive state from a centralised, Hindu and an 
exclusive state’.109 This remains as much a work in progress as the post-earthquake 
reconstruction. Seen from this perspective it is vital to understand the complex interplay of 
vulnerability and resilience, conflict and disaster, in order to meet the challenge of building 
communities that are resilient to natural hazard-related disasters and conflicts alike. 
This is not just a lesson for Nepal. As mentioned at the start of this paper, there are a great 
many communities that find themselves subject to a layering of conflict and disaster and 
searching for more effective means of responding to both. Nepal’s experience provides a 
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salutary lesson in the futility of trying to entirely separate PDR and PCR processes, and 
suggests that reconstruction cannot be effective if it fails to acknowledge the politics of this 
process. This is all the more important given the failure of the Sendai Framework to address 
the question of conflict in its guidance. Understanding the politics of the post-conflict and 
post-disaster nexus in Nepal provides a vital example of how the post-conflict experiences of 
a country can impact on its post-disaster trajectory, just as choices made in the PDR process 
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Figure 1. Map of conflict intensity in Nepal Civil War (Source: Do and Iyer 2010) 
 
Figure 2: Map of deaths and injuries from 2015 Earthquake by intensity (Source: MapAction 
2015) 
 
 
